题 目：Bargaining and Sharing Revenue with a Big Retailer in Channel Selection
报告人：戴悦 教授（复旦大学）
时 间：4月10（周五）下午13:00-14:40
地 点：经济管理学院335会议室
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报告摘要：
Motivated by the electronic appliances market in China, we study a manufacturer‟s channel selection problem with two asymmetric retailers. The big retailer operates a store-within-a-store model, where the manufacturer sets up his own store, pays the slotting fee and a portion of the revenue to the retailer. The small retailer is a traditional reseller, which might be independent or integrated by the manufacturer. We formulate a three-stage game for the manufacturer‟s channel selection problem and analyze three mechanisms determining the transaction terms: (1) the revenue-sharing rate and the slotting fee are both negotiable, (2) the revenue-sharing rate alone is negotiable while the slotting fee is exogenously given, (3) the revenue-sharing rate is decided by the big retailer and the slotting fee is exogenous. Our findings include: the bargaining mechanisms (1) and (2) result in the two payment themes as observed in the practice; between the manufacturer and the big retailer, the latter prefers bargaining over both the revenue-sharing rate and the slotting fee while the former favors bargaining over the revenue-sharing rate solely; when the revenue-sharing rate alone is negotiable, the big retailer will achieve a higher revenue share if the slotting fee is lower; when the transaction term is single handedly determined by the big retailer rather than being negotiated, the big retailer might squeeze out the profit of the manufacturer and result in a lose-lose situation in the channel.
报告人简介：
戴悦，复旦大学管理学院教授，美国北卡州立大学工业工程博士，美国麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院/香港城市大学访问学者。教育部新世纪优秀人才，国家自然科学基金优秀青年基金（首届）获得者，复旦大学卓识计划人选，2009年 “Most Cited Articles By Chinese Mainland Authors 2004-2008, Elsevier Economics Journals”荣誉称号。已发表国际顶级期刊论文多篇。研究方向： 供应链管理, 收益管理，物流管理, 博弈论，库存控制等。